

# **Finding Security Vulnerabilities Using Coccinelle**

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# Overview

- Where to look
- How to look
- Focus on `copy_from_user`
- Generate "design pattern" whitelist
- Track output
- More ideas

# Where to look

- scary userspace/kernel boundaries
  - ioctl
  - copy\_from\_user
  - copy\_to\_user
  - netlink
- interfaces with few consumers
  - rare network protocols (SCTP, RDS)
  - video DRM (mostly just Xorg)
  - network diagnostics (handful of debug tools)
  - new syscalls
  - compat layer

# How to look

- favorite editor
- grep
- [coccinelle](#)
  - [start-up tutorial on LWN from 2009](#)
  - many good upstream [bug-finding examples](#)
  - my simple [parallel run harness](#)
- [sparse](#)
- [smatch](#)

# Focus on copy\_from\_user

- Started with `__copy_from_user`
  - very few callers, used `grep`
  - Intel DRM ([CVE-2010-2962](#))
  - RDS ([CVE-2010-3904](#), Dan Rosenberg)
- Poked at `copy_to_user`
  - kernel leaks, used [simple coccinelle rule](#)
  - net ioctl ([CVE-2010-3861](#))
  - net ioctl ([CVE-2010-4655](#))
- Moved on to `copy_from_user`
  - ~4000 callers, used [complex coccinelle rule](#)
  - usb io-warrior ([CVE-2010-4656](#))
  - v4l compat ([CVE-2010-2963](#))

# Generate "design pattern" whitelist

1. match the scary function
2. run and study output
3. add rule for safe usage pattern
4. goto 2

# Track output

- still have [800 lines of output](#)
- switch to diff-style output
- diff the outputs over time
- want to be automated

# More ideas

- other good targets?
  - mispatterns in ioctls
  - detecting partially initialized stack variables
  - more?