

Toolchain security features status update

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<https://outflux.net/slides/2023/lpc/features.pdf>

Flashback! 2022 security features review

	GCC	Clang
zero call-used registers	yes	yes
structure layout randomization	plugin	yes
stack protector guard location	arm64 arm32 riscv ppc	arm64 arm32 riscv ppc
forward edge CFI	CPU inline hash	CPU inline hash
backward edge CFI	CPU	CPU SCS:arm64
-fstrict-flex-arrays	in progress	workable
counted_by attribute	no	no
integer overflow protection	broken	broken

2023: security features review

	GCC	Clang	RustC
zero call-used registers	yes	yes	needed
structure layout randomization	plugin	yes	needed
stack protector guard location	arm64 arm32 riscv ppc	arm64 arm32 riscv ppc	N/A
forward edge CFI	CPU inline hash	CPU inline hash	in progress
backward edge CFI	CPU SCS:arm64	CPU SCS:arm64	SCS:arm64
-fstrict-flex-arrays	yes	yes	yes
counted_by attribute	in progress	in progress	???
integer overflow protection	broken	broken	exists

New compiler to consider: RustC

- With Rust in the Linux kernel, we need to keep RustC at parity with Clang and GCC so we avoid [cross-language attacks](#).
- Areas where Rust [hardening](#) needs attention:
 - zero call-used regs needs to happen in Rust code too
 - randstruct needs to work with Rust or structs aren't ordered correctly
 - kCFI is in progress ([slide 58](#))
 - counted_by attribute needs to be investigated
 - arithmetic overflow handling exists, but how to wire up traps consistently vs UBSan?

Parity reached: `-fstrict-flex-arrays=3`

- `-fstrict-flex-arrays=3`
 - Implemented in GCC [13](#)+
 - Implemented in Clang [16](#)+
- Includes logic changes for `-fsanitize=bounds` and `__builtin_dynamic_object_size()`
- Linux kernel [enabled](#) it globally in v6.5.

Work needed: stack protector guard location (no progress)

Arch	Linux Kernel Options	GCC	Clang
x86_64 & ia32	<code>-mstack-protector-guard-reg=fs</code> <code>-mstack-protector-guard-symbol=__stack_chk_guard</code>	yes (8.1+)	yes (16+)
arm64	<code>-mstack-protector-guard=sysreg</code> <code>-mstack-protector-guard-reg=sp_el0</code> <code>-mstack-protector-guard-offset=...TSK_STACK_CANARY...</code>	yes (9.1+)	yes (14+)
arm32	<code>-mstack-protector-guard=tls</code> <code>-mstack-protector-guard-offset=...TSK_STACK_CANARY...</code>	yes (13.1+)	yes (15+)
riscv	<code>-mstack-protector-guard=tls</code> <code>-mstack-protector-guard-reg=tp</code> <code>-mstack-protector-guard-offset=...TSK_STACK_CANARY...</code>	yes (12.1+)	needed
powerpc	<code>-mstack-protector-guard=tls</code> <code>-mstack-protector-guard-reg=r13</code>	yes (7.1+)	needed?

Work needed: forward edge CFI

- CPU hardware support (coarse-grain: marked entry point matching) at parity
 - x86 ENDBR instruction, GCC & Clang (CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT):
 - `-fcf-protection=branch`
 - arm64 BTI instruction, GCC & Clang (CONFIG_ARM64_BTI_KERNEL):
 - `-mbranch-protection=bti`
 - `__attribute__((target("branch-protection=bti")))`
 - GCC bug [still open](#)
- Software (fine-grain: per-function-prototype matching)
 - Clang: inline hash checking: `-fsanitize=kcfi` (arm64 and x86_64)
 - GCC: **inline hash checking needed** (earlier [arm64 effort](#) needs more attention)
- Exploitation of func pointers easier than ever via automated gadget discovery
 - <https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity19/presentation/wu-wei>

Work needed: backward edge CFI

- CPU hardware support at parity
 - x86 Shadow Stack CPU feature bit and implicit operation: no compiler support needed
 - **Kernel support landed finally** (Shadow Stack systems available for 3 years now)!
 - In-kernel Shadow Stack still not explored yet.
 - arm64 PAC instructions, GCC and Clang (CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL):
 - `-mbranch-protection=pac-ret[+leaf]`
 - `__attribute__((target("branch-protection=pac-ret[+leaf]")))`
- Software (shadow stack)
 - x86: inline hash checking (like kCFI) **would be nice to have in both Clang and GCC**
 - arm64 shadow call stack: GCC ([12.1](#)+) and Clang (CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK):
 - `-fsanitize=shadow-call-stack`

In progress: bounds-checked Flexible Array Members

New attribute to [annotate bounds of FAMs](#) to enable **flexible array** bounds checking at runtime:

```
struct object {  
    int items;  
    int flex[] __attribute__((__counted_by__(items)));  
};
```

Use new attribute for array bounds check of flexible arrays (via `-fsanitize=bounds`) and `__builtin_dynamic_object_size()` too (for `FORTIFY_SOURCE`).

GCC Status: counted_by attribute (*The Current Plan*)

1. Provide counted_by attribute to flexible array member (FAM).
2. Use the attribute in __builtin_dynamic_object_size (subobject only).
3. Use the attribute in array bounds sanitizer.
4. Improve __builtin_dynamic_object_size to use the attribute for whole-object.
5. Emit warnings when the user breaks the requirements for the new attribute.

We planned to finish 1-3 in GCC14, and then 4-5 in GCC15.

Have submitted [3rd version](#) for patches 1-3 to GCC upstream on 2023-08-29.

Due to a **missing data dependency issue** raised during review, have to **postpone all 1-5 to GCC15**.

GCC Status: counted_by attribute (*Missing Data Dependency*)

```
1 struct A {  
2   size_t size;  
3   char buf[] __attribute__((counted_by(size)));  
4 };  
5 size_t foo (size_t sz) {  
6   struct A *obj = __builtin_malloc (sizeof(struct A) + sz * sizeof(char));  
7   obj->size = sz;  
8   return __builtin_dynamic_object_size (obj->buf, 1);  
9 }
```

The call to `__bdos` at line 8 will use `obj->size` at line 7.

This implicit data dependency **is missing** in the source code.

Compiler might **reorder** these two statements or apply other wrong optimizations without the data dependency presenting.

GCC Status: counted_by attribute (*Missing Data Dependency*)

The solution

- a new GCC internal function to carry this data dependency.
 `.ACCESS_WITH_SIZE (REF_TO_OBJ, REF_TO_SIZE, ...)`
- replace every reference to a FAM field with counted_by with this function.

```
7 obj->size = sz;  
  tmp = .ACCESS_WITH_SIZE (obj->buf, &obj->size, ...)  
8 return __builtin_dynamic_object_size (tmp, 1);
```

GCC Status: counted_by attribute (*The User Interface*)

counted_by (COUNT)

The number of the elements of the FAM is given by the field named COUNT in the same structure.

```
struct P {  
    size_t count;  
    char array[] __attribute__((counted_by (count)));  
} *p;
```

Two Requirements:

1. p->count should be **initialized before** the first reference to p->array.
2. p->array has **at least** p->count number of elements available **all the time**.

One important feature:

A ref to the FAM will use the **latest value** assigned to the size field:

```
p->count = val1; ref1 (p->array);  
p->count = val2; ref2 (p->array);  
ref1 uses val1, ref2 uses val2.
```

GCC Status: counted_by attribute (*A Small Example*)

test.h:

```
struct annotated {
    size_t count;
    char other;
    char array[] __attribute__((counted_by (count)));
};
/* Compute the minimum # of bytes needed to hold a structure "annotated",
   whose # of elements of "array" is COUNT.  */
#define MAX(A, B) (A > B) ? (A) : (B)
#define ALLOC_SIZE_ANNOTATED(COUNT) \
    MAX(sizeof (struct annotated), \
         offsetof(struct annotated, array[0]) + (COUNT) * sizeof(char))
/* Allocate the memory for the structure with FAM,
   update "count" with the # of elements "index".  */
static struct annotated * __attribute__((__noinline__)) alloc_buf (int index)
{
    struct annotated *p;
    p = (struct annotated *) malloc (ALLOC_SIZE_ANNOTATED(index));
    p->count = index;
    return p;
}
```

GCC Status: counted_by attribute (*A Small Example*)

Use counted_by in bound sanitizer:

```
test.c:  
#include "test.h"  
int main ()  
{  
    struct annotated *p_annotated = alloc_buf (10);  
    p_annotated->array[11] = 0; // out-of-bounds access, can GCC detect it?  
    return 0;  
}
```

Yes, it can with the counted_by attribute:

```
$ my_gcc -O2 -fsanitize=bounds test.c && ./a.out  
test.c:22:21: runtime error: index 11 out of bounds for type 'int [*]'
```

GCC Status: counted_by attribute (*A Small Example*)

Use counted_by in __bdos for sub-object size:

```
test.c:
#include "test.h"
#include <stdio.h>

int main ()
{
    struct annotated *p = alloc_buf (10);
    printf ("The max __bdos sub-object is %lu\n",
           __builtin_dynamic_object_size (p->array, 1));
    // Can GCC compute the sub-object size now?
    return 0;
}
```

Yes, it can with the counted_by attribute:

```
$ my_gcc -O2 test.c && ./a.out
The max __bdos sub-object is 10
```


GCC Status: counted_by attribute (*Further Improvement*)

Improve `__bdos` for whole-object size!!

In general, given a structure with fixed-size trailing array:

```
struct fixed {
    size_t count;
    char array[10];
};

struct fixed *p = alloc_fixed ();
__builtin_dynamic_object_size(p->array, 0)???
```

Q: Can the compiler use the TYPE of “struct fixed” for the whole object size?

A: **Theoretically, NO**, since p might point to an array of “struct fixed”.

But, given a structure with FAM:

```
struct annotated {
    size_t count;
    char array[]__attribute__((counted_by (count)));
};

struct annotated *q = alloc_annotated (10);
__builtin_dynamic_object_size(q->array, 0)???
```

Q: can the compiler use the TYPE and “counted_by” for the whole object size?

A: Yes. Since a structure with FAM can not be an element of an array, so, “q” must point to an single object with “struct annotated”

GCC Status: counted_by attribute (*Further Improvement*)

Issue warnings when user requirements are violated:

1. p->count should be **initialized before** the first reference to p->array.

```
struct annotated *p;  
p = (struct annotated *)  
    malloc (ALLOC_SIZE_ANNOTATED(n));  
p->array[n + 1] = 10; // out-of-bound will  
                    // not be detected.  
  
p->count = n;
```

2. p->array has **at least** p->count number of elements available all the time.

```
struct annotated *p;  
p = (struct annotated *)  
    malloc (ALLOC_SIZE_ANNOTATED(n));  
p->count = n + SIZE_BUMP;  
p->array[n + 1] = 10; // out-of-bound  
                    //will not be detected.
```

Compilation time: -Wcounted-by

Run time: -fsanitizer=counted-by

GCC Status: `counted_by` attribute (*Future Work*)

- Add the `counted_by` attribute for FAM first; (GCC15?)
- Extend the `counted_by` attribute to general pointers;
- Add more attributes later if needed (`sized_by`, `ended_by`, etc);
- Integrate the array bounds information for FAM and general pointers into language syntax and TYPE system.
- The potential to integrate the [`-fbounds-safety` proposal](#) into GCC.

Clang Status: `counted_by` attribute (*Current Status*)

Working closely with GCC on the implementation. One change from GCC's implementation. Borrowing from Qing's slide:

1. Provide `counted_by` attribute to flexible array member (FAM).
2. Use the attribute in `__builtin_dynamic_object_size` (sub-object only).
3. Use the attribute in array bounds sanitizer.
4. **Improve `__builtin_dynamic_object_size` to use the attribute for whole-object.**
5. Emit warnings when the user breaks the requirements for the new attribute.

Clang Status: counted_by attribute (*Reminder*)

test.h:

```
struct annotated {
    size_t count;
    char other;
    char array[] __attribute__((counted_by (count)));
};

/* ... MAX and ALLOC_SIZE_ANNOTATED definitions ... */

/* Allocate the memory for the structure with a FAM,
   update "count" with the # of elements "count". */
static struct annotated * __attribute__((__noinline__)) alloc_buf(int count) {
    struct annotated *p;
    p = (struct annotated *) malloc(ALLOC_SIZE_ANNOTATED(index));
    p->count = count;
    return p;
}
```

Clang Status: counted_by attribute (*Examples*)

```
$ cat test.c
```

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "test.h"
```

```
extern void foo(char c);
```

```
int main () {
    struct annotated *p = alloc_buf (10);

    /* Sanitizer: Out-of-bounds index. */
    foo(p->array[42]);
    return 0;
}
```

```
$ clang -O2 -fsanitize=array-bounds test.c && ./a.out
```

```
test.c:11:9: runtime error: index 42 out of bounds for type 'char *'
SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: undefined-behavior test.c:11:9 in
The value is 0.
```

Clang Status: counted_by attribute (*Examples*)

```
$ cat test.c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "test.h"

int main () {
    struct annotated *p = alloc_buf (10);

    /* Size of a flexible array member. */
    printf("The max __bdos(p->array, 1) == %lu.\n",
        __builtin_dynamic_object_size(p->array, 1));
    return 0;
}
```

```
$ clang -O2 test.c && ./a.out
The max __bdos(p->array, 1) == 10.
```

Clang Status: counted_by attribute (*Examples*)

```
$ cat test.c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "test.h"

int main () {
    struct annotated *p = alloc_buf (10);

    /* Size of pointer within a flexible array member. */
    printf("The max __bdos(&p->array[3]) == %lu.\n",
        __builtin_dynamic_object_size(&p->array[3], 1));
    return 0;
}
```

```
$ clang -O2 test.c && ./a.out
The max __bdos(&p->array[3], 1) == 7.
```


Clang Status: counted_by attribute (*Examples*)

```
$ cat test.c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "test.h"

int main () {
    struct annotated *p = alloc_buf (10);

    /* Size of a flexible array member with out-of-bounds indices. */
    printf("The max __bdos(&p->array[-1], 1) == %lu.\n",
        __builtin_dynamic_object_size(&p->array[-1], 1));
    printf("The max __bdos(&p->array[42], 1) == %lu.\n",
        __builtin_dynamic_object_size(&p->array[42], 1));
    return 0;
}
```

```
$ clang -O2 test.c && ./a.out
The max __bdos(&p->array[-1], 1) == 0.
The max __bdos(&p->array[42], 1) == 0.
```

Clang Status: counted_by attribute (*Examples*)

```
$ cat test.c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "test.h"

int main () {
    struct annotated *p = alloc_buf (10);

    /* Size of struct with a flexible array member. */
    printf("The max __bdos(p, 1) == %lu.\n",
        __builtin_dynamic_object_size(p, 1));
    return 0;
}
```

```
$ clang -O2 test.c && ./a.out
The max __bdos(p, 1) == 19.
```

Clang Status: -fbounds-safety (*Future Work*)

- Adopt GCC's data dependency workaround and new flags
- Work with Apple and GCC to implement Apple's bounds safety features:
 - Pointers to a single object: **__single**
 - Pointer arithmetic is a compile time error
 - External bounds annotations: **__counted_by(N)**, **__sized_by(N)**, and **__ended_by(P)**
 - Internal bounds annotations (i.e. "Rubenesque" pointers): **__bidi_indexable** and **__indexable**
 - Sentinel-delimited arrays: **__null_terminated** and **__terminated_by(T)**
 - Annotation for interoperating with bounds-unsafe code: **__unsafe_indexable**

See [Apple's LLVM Enforcing Bounds Safety in C RFC](#)

Work needed: bounds checking for general pointers

- Two types of arrays
 - Fixed-sized **bounds in TYPE**
 - Dynamically-sized
 - Variable-length array (VLA) **bounds in TYPE**
 - Flexible array member (FAM) **bounds in attribute**
 - Pointer offset **where are the bounds?**
- The `-fbounds-safety` extension offers bounds annotations that can be attached to pointers **in general**.
([Apple's RFC for LLVM\[1\] on May 24, 2023](#))

Work needed: - fbounds - safety proposal from Apple

- A **superset** of counted_by attribute
- **Covers all** the pointers and arrays (including FAM)
- **More effort and burden** when adopting existing C applications
- We might consider to add this later

Work needed: other aspects of bounds checking

- Handling nested structures ending in a Flexible Array Member (Clang)
 - <https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/72032>
- -Warray-bounds false positives (GCC, due to jump threading)
 - https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=109071
- Language extension to support Flexible Array Members in Unions
 - <https://gcc.gnu.org/pipermail/gcc/2023-May/241426.html>

```
union u {  
    int foo;  
    char bar[ 0 ];  
};
```

Work needed: arithmetic overflow protection

- Technically working ...
 - GCC & Clang: `-fsanitize={signed-integer-overflow,pointer-overflow}`
 - Clang: `-fsanitize=unsigned-integer-overflow`
- ... but there are some significant behavioral caveats related to `-fwrapv` and `-fwrapv-pointer` (enabled via kernel's use of `-fno-strict-overflow`)
 - "It's not an undefined behavior to wrap around."
- More than avoiding "undefined behavior", we want no "unexpected behavior".
 - Like run-time bounds checking, **need arithmetic overflow to be handled** as a trap or "warn and continue with wrapped value" *and* a way to optionally allow wrap-around.
 - It would be nice to have a "warn and continue with saturated value" mode instead, to reduce the chance of denial of service and reach normal error checking.
- Clarify language for "overflow" vs "wrap around"

Questions / Comments ?

Thank you for your attention!

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Bonus Slides...

counted_by may track logical (instead of allocated) size

```
struct annotated {
    unsigned short allocated;
    unsigned short usable;
    ...
    struct foo array[] __attribute__((counted_by (usable)));
};

struct annotated *p;
int i = 0;

p = malloc(sizeof(*p) + sizeof(p->array[0]) * max_item_queue_size);
p->allocated = max_item_queue_size;
p->usable = 0;
while (items_available() && i < p->allocated) {
    p->usable ++;
    memcpy(&p->array[i++], next_item(), sizeof(p->array[0]));
}
```

Work needed: Link Time Optimization

- Toolchain support is at parity
 - GCC: `-flto`
 - Clang: `-flto` or `-flto=thin`

- Linux kernel support is only present with Clang
- No recent patches sent to LKML
- Latest development branch (against v5.19) appears to be Jiri Slaby's, continuing Andi Kleen's work:
 - <https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jirislaby/linux.git/log/?h=lto>

Work needed: Spectre v1 mitigation

- GCC: wanted? no open bug...
- Clang:
 - `-mspeculative-load-hardening`
 - `__attribute__((speculative_load_hardening))`
 - <https://lvm.org/docs/SpeculativeLoadHardening.html>
- Performance impact is relatively high, but lower than using lfence everywhere.
- Really needs some kind of “reachability” logic to reduce overhead.

- Does anyone care about this?